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Abstract 
 
Asymmetric information has become one of the most influential theoretical concepts in explaining competitive insurance 
market. In contract theory, asymmetric information is the situation when one party of an economic transaction possesses 
information that is not available to the other contractual party.In this perspective, this paper aims to investigate the presence of 
asymmetric information in Tunisian automobile insurance market. This investigation is made using an individual data set during 
the year 2009. For this purpose, we employ two empirical approaches; the bivariate probit model and the two stages approach 
of Richaudeau (1999). Hence, results show a strong evidence for the presence of asymmetric information for the begging 
drivers. Inversely, for the experienced drivers, no evidence of asymmetric information have been detected. 
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 Introduction 1.
 
Asymmetric information has become one of the most influential theoretical concepts in explaining competitive insurance 
market. In contract theory, asymmetric information is the situation when one party of an economic transaction possesses 
information that is not available to the other contractual party. 
In fact, Asymmetric information arises when an informational gap exists between an insurer and an insured. In 
such situation, insureds are more informed about their own characteristics or actions than their insurer. Potentially, this 
could be a harmful situation because the insured can take advantage of the insurer's lack of knowledge. In a nutshell, 
asymmetric information can leads to a problematic because it creates opportunities for lying and cheating by insured, 
which by the way can induce market inefficiency or even failure (Arrow 1963).  
In this field, a number of empirical studies propose to measure the presence of residual asymmetric information 
problems in several automobile insurance markets. One can refers to Dahlby (1983/1992) for Canada, Puelz and Snow 
(1994) for USA, Richaudeau (1999) for France, Saito (2006) for Japan, Kim et al. (2009) for Korea, Englund (2010) for 
Denmark, Shi and Valdez (2011) for Singapore, and Li et al. (2013) for Taiwan case. Besides a recent review article by 
Dionne et al. (2013) which summarized the theoretical and the empirical literature concerning asymmetric information in 
road safety and automobile insurance market. 
In the Canadian automobile insurance market, two initial studies (Dahlby, 1983 and 1992) have estimated the sign 
of the correlation between the level of insurance coverage and ex-post realizations of risk. Puelz and Snow (1994) found 
positive coverage-risk correlation using individual data obtained from a Georgia insurer.  
However, several empirical studies show no evidence for asymmetric information. Using a French data set, 
Richaudeau (1999) as well as Chiappori and Salanié (2000) find no systematic relationship between coverage and risk. In 
addition, Dionne et al. (2001) reach a similar conclusion for the Canadian automobile insurance market: those who are 
more likely to submit claims do not buy more insurance. Moreover, these researchers criticized Puelz and Snow (1994) 
for failing to consider nonlinear effects. 
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On the other hand, Cohen (2005) did not find any correlation for beginning drivers1, she founds a strong 
correlation for experienced drivers. Although, the study suggested the importance of “learning” in this market. 
Saito (2006) used an individual data from the Japanese auto insurance market, where insurance rates are strictly 
regulated. First, he found a positive but not statistically significant correlation between the crash risk and the purchase of 
own-vehicle coverage, even under the control of all variables observed by the insurer. Second, he concluded that there 
was a significant and negative correlation between coverage and risk when they are defined as the purchase of a zero-
deductible policy and a crash risk.  
Recent empirical studies in the competitive insurance market show a presence of asymmetric information in these 
markets. To take some of the outstanding studies, Grun-Rehomme and Benlagha (2007) examined the choice between 
basic third party coverage and deductible variable for beginning and experienced drivers. Their study used 4 guarantees’ 
types concerning the year 2004, this was made after the new circulation security measures’ implementation and the 
decrease of mortals’ accidents road. Using a bivariate ordered model, the researchers find a significant positive 
correlation risk-coverage for beginning drivers which choice the third party insurance plus deductible variable for French 
data.  
We can notice that most of the previous empirical focuses on the coverage-risk correlation. This paper contributes 
to the literature by reexamining whether such coverage-risk correlation exists. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate on residual asymmetric information in the Tunisian automobile insurance 
market and to find ways to improve and reduce the negative impact of asymmetric information on resource allocation. 
Hence, the objectives of this research proposal are to test the presence of the adverse selection in the Tunisian 
insurance market and to determine various factors affecting the contact choice and accident occurrence in the studied 
insurance market. 
For this purpose, we use a data set that includes all information that an insurer had about its policyholders for the 
2009 year. Our paper differs from earlier studies in two points; 
First, we use a recent data from the Tunisian insurance market, which is not investigated in the empirical literature. 
This data is concerning the year 2009, after the implementation of the new no-claims bonus class. Second, we use the 
two-stage regression analysis developed by Richaudeau (1999) where the probit model is used for coverage choice 
equation (first stage) and the negative binomial model for the accident frequency equation (second stage).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents briefly the Tunisian automobile 
insurance market. Then, section 3 presents the models used and the empirical test for the presence of asymmetric 
information. Section 4 describes the data and reports a descriptive statistics analysis of the data set. Section 5 analyses 
and discusses the empirical results. The last section concludes and discusses possible future work.  
 
 The Tunisian Automobile Insurance Market 2.
 
In Tunisia, the insurance sector plays an important role in the development of the private sector and the modernization of 
the securities markets2. For instance, the Tunisian market characterized by the presence of 22 insurance companies 
operating in 24 regions. We find 12 of these companies engage in multi-branch operations, 6 are single branch 
companies (3 specialize in life insurance, 1 in expert insurance, 1 in credit insurance and 1 in reinsurance) and 4 are off-
shore companies authorized to conduct operations with nonresidents. 
The insurance industry is dominated by the private sector, with 61.27% in 2010. The level of average premium has 
increased from 98,355 TND (in 2009 to 106,195 TND in 2010). 
Looking to their products’ distribution in 2008, insurance companies use about 697 intermediaries (614 insurance 
agents, 55 brokers and 28 agents authorized to sell life insurance) forming a network making insurance policies presents 
in all different regions. They employ also about 10 actuaries and 1008 experts and commissioners of damage authorized 
to assess and evaluate the losses and damages. 
In 2010, the Tunisian market structure has not changed; the automobile insurance contributes to total business 
with 46.18% of the market. The life insurance branch, with 14.45%, follows it. The group health insurance, various risks, 
transport and fire insurance branches experienced the highest growth rates, with 13.05%, 11.22%, 6.76% and 5.65%, 
respectively. 
 
 
                                                                            
1 Beginning drivers are those having less than 3 years’ driving experience before contracting with the insurer. 
2  The description of the insurance market in this section is based on the notes of the F.T.U.S.A. (2010) 
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 Methodology 3.
 
To investigate the presence of adverse selection in the Tunisian automobile insurance market, we employ two models: 
the two-stage regression analysis developed by Richaudeau (1999) and the bivaiat bivariate probit model introduced by 
Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Dionne et al. (2001). 
 
3.1 The two-stage regression analysis of Richaudeau (1999) 
 
In this modeling, the first stage aims to estimate the coverage choice and the second stage estimates the accident 
occurrence. 
 
3.1.1 Choice of a coverage equation (first stage) 
 
In this stage, the coverage choice can be defined as a dichotomous variable:  
 
A maximum likelihood probit regression is employed to estimate the deductible choice equation.  
Then, the generalized residual is given by: 
 (3) 
Where ࢥ (.) and Ɏ (.) are, respectively, the density and cumulative distribution functions of the standard normal 
distribution, and  is an estimated coefficient vector. If the  is positive (negative), then the policyholder has subscribed 
a third party coverage policy. 
 
3.1.2 The accident Frequency equation (second stage) 
 
In the second stage, we estimate the probability of accident using a count data model, and more precisely, a negative 
binomial model of the number of accidents. To test for asymmetric information, the residual obtained from the binary 
choice coverage model in equation (3) is used as input when estimating the negative binomial model3. The probability of 
having yi accidents is given by: 
 (4) 
Where Ƚ (.) is the Gamma function,  and are estimated coefficients vectors. The regression coefficient  
captures the correlation between the insurance coverage and the frequency of accidents, conditional on the effects of all 
observables on both the coverage choice and the accident frequency. If  is positive and statistically significant, we 
conclude the existence of asymmetric information. This will be our test of the efficiency in the Tunisian automobile 
insurance market. 
The Richaudeau's test may induce an estimation bias in the second-stage equation. Using the result of Murphy 
and Topel (1985), we correct this bias by testing the statistical significance of . In this last test, the asymptotic 
variance-covariance matrix for two-stage maximum likelihood model is defined as: 
 (5) 
Where,  
                                                                            
3 Based on the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) statistic, the negative binomial regression fits our data better than the Poisson 
regression (see statistics for dispersion parameters in Table 4). See also Kim et al. (2009) who show similar results for Korean data and 
Dionne and Vanasse (1992) for Canadian data. 
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3.2 Bivariate probit model 
 
To test the conditional independence between the contract choice and the accident occurrence, we follow the empirical 
approach proposed by Chiappori and Salanié (2000). In fact, they use a bivariate probit model to examine the coverage-
risk correlation.  
In this modeling, the accident occurrence is presented as follows:  
 
Hence, the bivariate model is composed by two equations: 
- The equation of the deductible Choice 
 (6) 
- The equation of accident Occurrence 
  (7) 
In this specification, and are coefficients to be estimated.  represents the matrix of observable 
independent variables. The two error terms, and satisfy the following standard conditions: 
 
In this model, measures the correlation between coverage and risk and allow as to conclude about the presence 
of residual adverse selection in the portfolio.  
 
 Empirical Methodology 4.
 
4.1 Data  
 
To investigate the asymmetric information, we consider a portfolio of 54040 policies that contains information for 31125 
policyholders  
In this empirical study, we employ 11 variables, consisting of the policyholder’s car’s and accident’s characteristics. 
The description of different variables are presented in the appendix (1).  
In our analysis, the coverage choice measured by third party coverage versus comprehensive coverage rather 
than low premium versus high premium. Thus, we define it as follows: 
 
 
4.2 Summary statistics 
 
To begin with, let us give an overview of our data set.  
The file contains 5301 women (17.03% of total population) and 25824 males (82.97%) of 
which 15742 leading vehicle for commuting and family use and 15383 driving vehicles for commercial use. The average 
premium is 314TND and the maximum premium that the insurer receives is 5909 TND. The number of accidents 
stretches from no accidents up to 8 accidents, where the mean value is 0.20 indicating a low frequency of accidents. 
Most vehicles are of French brand 18306 (or 58.81% of all cars), with 9216 cars for private use and 9090 cars for 
commercial use, and which are respectively 50.34% and 49.66%. Moreover, about 30% of the drivers live in the Coast of 
Tunisia especially in the governorate of Sousse. It is very eventful on the economic, administrative and social capital. 
Concerning the job of the policyholders’ variable, employees represent about 50% of the population and 21% are 
functionaries whereas 12% are artisan. 
In our sample of 31125 contracts, we have information on the number of responsible accidents reported by the 
insured to his insurer in 2009. Our data includes 822 contracts (1176 contracts) that have at least one accident during the 
contract year for the beginning drivers (experienced drivers), 620 (745) contracts claimed two accidents, 114 (161) 
contracts made 3 accidents and 73 (123) contracts claimed more than three accidents (See table1). No single 
policyholder in our portfolio incurred more than eight accidents during the year. 
Y
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Table 1. Distribution of number of accidents 
 
Number of accidents Total Beginners drivers Experienced drivers Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
0 27291 87.68 13424 89.18 13867 86.28 
1 1998 6.42 822 5.46 1176 7.32 
2 1365 4.39 620 4.12 745 4.64 
3 275 0.88 114 0.76 161 1.00 
4 134 0.43 56 0.37 78 0.49 
5 28 0.09 10 0.07 18 0.11 
6 19 0.06 5 0.03 14 0.09 
7 6 0.02 0 0.00 6 0.04 
8 9 0.03 2 0.01 7 0.04 
Total 31125 100 15053 100 16072 100 
 
 Results 5.
 
5.1 The choice of coverage 
 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the probit modeling that is the first step regression analysis of Richaudeau 
(1999). The left-hand side of this table suggests the estimation for the beginning drivers whereas the right-hand side 
presents the estimation for the experienced drivers.  
For the beginning drivers, commuting and family use cars are more likely to be insured by comprehensive 
insurance than commercial use cars. In addition, we note that females have a greater probability of choosing a 
comprehensive coverage than males, indicating perhaps that their risk-aversion is greater. The probability of buying third 
party insurance is higher for the policyholders who have age between 56 and 75 years.  
For the experienced drivers, the probability of choosing third party coverage is more important for female and for 
the policyholders who are older than 31 years. Primary use cars are more likely to be insured by comprehensive 
coverage than commercial use cars. 
One interesting point to note is that the jobs of the policyholders also have a role in the choice of coverage. The 
probability of choosing third party coverage decreases with the senior executive, the artisan, the employee and the 
unemployed. 
 
Table 2. Probit model results 
 
Independent variables Beginning drivers Experienced drivers Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Female 0.215 0.000 -0.213 0.000 
Primary use -0.040 0.069 0.065 0.008 
Age 2 -0.122 0.565 -0.294 0.212 
Age 3 -0.237 0.258 -0.771 0.001 
Age 4 -0.520 0.014 -0.716 0.002 
Age 5 -0.203 0.361 -0.486 0.039 
Job 1 0.065 0.152 -0.162 0.002 
Job 2 0.093 0.227 -0.069 0.425 
Job 3 0.145 0.101 -0.260 0.007 
Job 4 0.015 0.766 -0.084 0.145 
Job 5 0.002 0.952 -0.113 0.020 
Job 6 0.039 0.526 -0.263 0.000 
Origin 1 -0.024 0.861 0.009 0.949 
Origin 2 -0.012 0.931 0.030 0.832 
Origin 3 -0.030 0.832 -0.006 0.966 
Origin 4 -0.022 0.878 0.013 0.925 
Origin 5 -0.148 0.502 0.308 0.297 
Origin 6 0.011 0.966 0.516 0.108 
Zone 1 0.030 0.418 -0.023 0.557 
Zone 2 0.044 0.314 0.024 0.623 
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Zone 3 0.008 0.852 0.002 0.96 
Zone 4 -0.032 0.380 -0.035 0.397 
Zone 5 0.006 0.905 0.062 0.318 
Constant 0.851 0.001 1.922 0.000 
Number of obs 15053 16072
Log likelihood -8618.224 -6764.429
 
5.2 The probability of having an accident 
 
According to the estimated parameters in the second equation related to the occurrence of accidents (the second part of 
table 4), the probability of making at least one accident at the insurer increases according to female and to the agent lives 
in big Tunis. Furthermore, this probability decreases with job of the drivers. Particularly, the accident occurrence is 
negatively related to the unemployed person, the employee and the retired person. 
Table 3 shows that many exogenous variables have a significant effect on accidents frequency for both beginning 
and experience drivers. A special note is the need for some exogenous variables. First, we examine the frequency of 
accidents for beginning drivers. The positive sign for the coefficients of gender and the residence area that suggests that 
female and policyholders live in big Tunis have a higher chance to incur accidents. In addition, we observe a positive 
effect of vehicle's use on the probability of accident. The policyholder specifies the primary use of the insured car as for 
commercial use that has a higher chance of accidents. Second, we move to examine the accident frequencies for 
experienced drivers. We observe that the accident frequency is positively related to the job and the residence area of 
policyholders. This probability decreases according to the age of drivers.  
 
Table 3. Negative Binomial model Results 
 
Independent variables 
Beginning drivers Experienced drivers 
Coefficient 
Mtopel 
Std.Err. p-Value Coefficient 
Mtopel
Std. Err. 
 
p-Value 
Accident frequencies equation
Female 1.377 0.943 0.144 0.253 0.324 0.434 
Primary use -0.347 0.203 0.088 0.062 0.099 0.529 
Age 2 -0.729 0.813 0.370 -1.319 0.305 0.000 
Age 3 -1.369 1.189 0.250 -0.902 0.744 0.225 
Age 4 -3.729 2.486 0.134 -1.776 0.674 0.008 
Age 5 0.192 1.076 0.858 0.176 0.421 0.676 
Job 1 0.759 0.341 0.026 0.818 0.243 0.001 
Job 2 0.966 0.484 0.046 0.593 0.186 0.001 
Job 3 1.201 0.701 0.087 0.791 0.409 0.054 
Job 4 0.561 0.210 0.789 0.824 0.160 0.000 
Job 5 -0.420 0.157 0.008 0.270 0.181 0.134 
Job 6 -0.264 0.323 0.413 0.418 0.387 0.280 
Origin 1 -0.123 0.562 0.827 0.514 0.326 0.115 
Origin 2 -0.039 0.567 0.945 0.501 0.336 0.136 
Origin 3 0.451 0.570 0.429 0.993 0.329 0.003 
Origin 4 -0.682 0.589 0.247 0.772 0.332 0.020 
Origin 5 0.351 0.973 0.718 0.747 0.607 0.218 
Origin 6 0.569 0.844 0.501 1.202 0.736 0.102 
Zone 1 1.013 0.224 0.000 0.946 0.091 0.000 
Zone 2 0.292 0.283 0.303 0.007 0.113 0.949 
Zone 3 0.487 0.220 0.027 0.287 0.107 0.008 
Zone 4 0.095 0.228 0.677 0.269 0.101 0.008 
Zone 5 0.082 0.289 0.775 0.337 0.147 0.022 
Constant 11.330 11.616 0.329 -3.149 5.812 0.588 
RESIDU -16.742 14.483 0.248 1.065 5.828 0.855 
Lnalpha cons 1.519 0.062 0.000 1.229 0.472 0.000 
Number of obs 15053 16072
Log likelihood -6680.201 -8486.713
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5.3 Testing for asymmetric information 
 
According to table 4, the first estimation results show that the correlation between the error terms of the two binary 
equations is positive. Thus, the estimated value of ȡ is 0.126 for beginning drivers. This association is strong and 
significant with a p-value of 0.000. Hence, we find that policyholders who purchase better coverage tend to be more 
prone to make claims. We therefore, find an evidence of asymmetric information, either with reference to adverse 
selection or with reference to moral hazard, especially when the observed variables are taking into account 
The second estimation results show that we again find a positive correlation between coverage-risk for 
experienced drivers. The estimates value of ȡ is 0.001. The p-value of ȡ, however, suggests that this association is not 
statistically significant (ȡ= 0.963). Therefore, we find no evidence of adverse selection or moral hazard. This result is 
consistent with that of Saito (2006). 
Table 3 provides, also, the estimate of the risk-coverage correlation for beginning drivers and experienced drivers. 
The negative binomial model gives us a similar result as the probit bivariate model. For the beginning drivers, the 
coefficient of the coverage choice residual variable is positive and statistically significant, this finding clearly demonstrates 
that asymmetric information is present in the Tunisian automobile insurance market. However, this coefficient becomes 
negative and statistically insignificant for the experienced drivers.  
To sum up, all these results show no evidence of asymmetric information for experienced drivers and the existence 
of evidence for beginning drivers. 
 
Table 4. Bivariate Probit Estimation Results 
 
 Beginning drivers Experienced drivers 
Independent  
Variables 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Choice of contractequation
Female 0.216 0.000 -0.213 0.000 
Commercial use 0.040 0.068 0.065 0.008 
Age 1 0.207 0.353 - - 
Age 2 0.082 0.308 -0.294 0.212 
Age 3 -0.033 0.666 -0.771 0.001 
Age 4 -0.316 0.000 -0.716 0.002 
Age 5 - - -0.486 0.039 
Job 1 0.065 0.154 -0.162 0.002 
Job 2 0.092 0.230 -0.069 0.425 
Job 3 0.145 0.101 -0.260 0.007 
Job 4 0.014 0.782 -0.084 0.145 
Job 5 0.001 0.981 -0.113 0.020 
Job 6 0.038 0.538 -0.263 0.000 
Origin 1 -0.024 0.864 0.009 0.949 
Origin 2 -0.011 0.938 0.030 0.833 
Origin 3 -0.029 0.836 -0.006 0.966 
Origin 4 -0.022 0.879 0.013 0.925 
Origin 5 -0.149 0.501 0.308 0.297 
Origin 6 0.001 0.998 0.516 0.108 
Zone 1 0.030 0.419 -0.023 0.575 
Zone 2 0.043 0.322 0.024 0.623 
Zone 3 0.008 0.854 0.002 0.961 
Zone 4 -0.032 0.378 -0.035 0.397 
Zone 5 0.007 0.905 0.062 0.318 
Constant 0.606 0.000 1.922 0.000 
 Accident occurrenceequation
Female 0.204 0.000 0.078 0.047 
Commercial use 0.107 0.000 -0.032 0.227 
Age 1 -0.759 0.001 - - 
Age 2 -1.032 0.000 -1.089 0.000 
Age 3 -1.043 0.000 -0.946 0.000 
Age 4 -1.426 0.000 -1.404 0.000 
Age 5 - - -0.056 0.683 
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Job 1 0.228 0.000 0.415 0.000 
Job 2 0.269 0.000 0.347 0.000 
Job 3 0.221 0.002 0.489 0.000 
Job 4 -0.084 0.026 0.428 0.000 
Job 5 -0.249 0.198 0.085 0.122 
Job 6 -0.294 0.000 0.234 0.002 
Origin 1 -0.020 0.001 0.257 0.144 
Origin 2 -0.007 0.917 0.231 0.198 
Origin 3 0.339 0.973 0.537 0.002 
Origin 4 -0.323 0.081 0.433 0.016 
Origin 5 0.783 0.108 0.559 0.039 
Origin 6 0.308 0.002 0.668 0.016 
Zone 1 0.462 0.312 0.540 0.000 
Zone 2 0.040 0.000 -0.017 0.774 
Zone 3 0.172 0.532 0.109 0.061 
Zone 4 0.121 0.007 0.121 0.013 
Zone 5 -0.054 0.024 0.219 0.001 
Constant -0.521 0.015 -0.989 0.000 
Athrho 0.127 0.000 0.001 0.963 
Rho 0.126 0.000 0.000 0.963 
Number of obs 15053 16072
Log likelihood -13226.16 -12483.116
Wald chi2(46) 1168.53 1482.76
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000
Like lihood-ratio test of rho=0
  
 
 Conclusion  6.
 
In this paper, we examined coverage-risk relationship in the Tunisian automobile insurance market using a cross 
sectional data from a major insurer. We used the bivariate probit model and the negative binomial model to help 
describing any evidence of private information. When analyzing the entire portfolio of policyholders from the insurer, all 
our procedures give the same results. For the beginning drivers, we found significant positive relationship between 
policyholder’s coverage choice and the occurrence of accidents, indicating the presence of adverse selection. This 
relationship provides evidence that some unobserved and unobservable factors affects the insurance contract choice. 
Therefore, for the experienced drivers, asymmetric information seems to be at most a negligible phenomenon in the 
insurance automobile market.  
One major criticism of the conditional correlation approach with cross sectional data is that it does not allow 
separation adverse selection from moral hazard. Our analysis is limited to a combined result of the two asymmetric 
information problems. However, as suggested by Abbring et al. (2003), dynamic data could help distinguish between the 
adverse selection and moral hazard. Finally, we leave this as one of the future research directions to pursue. 
 
Appendix 1.  
 
Characteristics of the Driver 
 
Gender: 1 if the insured is male (82.97%); 0 if the insured is female (17.03%). 
Age: the age of the policyholder (mean =45.49, std. dev. =13.29, min= 18, max= 98). 
Age’s categories : we use five dummy variables 
Age 1 = 1 if the policyholder have age between 18 and 21 years (0.47%); 0 otherwise. 
Age 2 = 1 if the policyholder have age between 22 and 30 years (11.60%); 0 otherwise. 
Age 3 = 1 if the policyholder have age between 31 and 55 years (66.86%); 0 otherwise. 
Age 4 = 1 if the policyholder have age between 56 and 75 years (16.65%); 0 otherwise. 
Age 5 = 1 if the policyholder is older than 75 years (4.42%); 0 otherwise. 
Job: For the job of the policyholder, many possible classifications can be used to distinguish between professions 
for policyholders. In this study, we propose seven dichotomous variables defined as follows:  
( ) )000.02(700.3912 =>= χχ P ( ) )963.02(002.012 =>= χχ P
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Job 1 = 1 if the policyholder is an official (21.21%); 0 otherwise. 
Job 2 = 1 if the policyholder is a senior executive (2.78%); 0 otherwise. 
Job 3 = 1 if the policyholder is an unemployed person (8.01%); 0 otherwise. 
Job 4 = 1 if the policyholder is a craft (11.96%); 0 otherwise. 
Job 5 = 1 if the policyholder is an employee (48.61%); 0 otherwise. 
Job 6 = 1 if the policyholder is a retired person (5.49%); 0 otherwise. 
Job 7 = 1 if the policyholder is a middle manager (1.94%); 0 otherwise. 
 
- Residence area variables: we define 6 dichotomous variables to capture the effect of the immediate environment of the 
individual driver. 
Zone 1 = 1 if the policyholder lives in big Tunis (28.35%); 0 otherwise.  
Zone 2 = 1 if the policyholder lives in North (12.45%); 0 otherwise. 
Zone 3 = 1 if the policyholder lives in Northwest (10.83%); 0 otherwise. 
Zone 4 = 1 if the policyholder lives in Coast (29.90%); 0 otherwise. 
Zone 5 = 1 if the policyholder lives in Center (5.71%); 0 otherwise. 
Zone 6 = 1 if the policyholder lives in South (12.76%); 0 otherwise. 
 
Characteristics of the car 
- Use of the car = 1 if the policyholder specifies the primary use of the insured car as for commuting and family use (50.58%); 0 
otherwise (i.e., commercial use) (49.42%). 
 
Car brand: We define seven categories that capture the car’s country-of-origin effect. 
Origin 1 = 1 if the car made in France (58.81%); 0 otherwise. 
Origin 2 = 1 if the car made in Italy (12.62%); 0 otherwise. 
Origin 3 = 1 if the car made in German (17.31%); 0 otherwise. 
Origin 4 = 1 if the car made in China or in Korea or in Japan (9.92%); 0 otherwise. 
Origin 5 = 1 if the car made in the USA (0.34%); 0 otherwise. 
Origin 6 = 1 if the car made in England (0.28%); 0 otherwise. 
Origin 7 = 1 if the car made in other countries (0.70%); 0 otherwise. 
Past involvement in accidents 
Accidents’ number: the number of accident (mean = 0.207, std. dev. = 0.646, min = 0, max=8). 
Bonus-malus classes: it is a discrete variable. There are 8 classes from 1 to 8 (mean =5.845, std. dev. =2.275, min=0, max=8). 
Indemnity: it is a continue variable (mean = 163, std. dev. = 1511.232, min = 0, max = 105111). 
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